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II 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Petitioner appeals from the denial of a petition for post conviction 
relief following an evidentiary hearing. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The facts and background of the underlying criminal case were succinctly 
explained in the published opinion of the direct appeal of a co-defendant, State 
v. Gerardo, 147 Idaho 22 (Ct.App. 2009): 
On January 24, 2006, three masked men wearing dark clothing, 
one with a blue bandana, entered the Lotus Garden restaurant 
brandishing firearms. They demanded money from the owner, 
Hong Ha, and Ha's daughter, Karen, and threatened to shoot them 
if they did not comply. When the men realized that Hong's wife was 
on the telephone with the police in another portion of the restaurant, 
they fled the building, got into a white Pontiac Grand Prix, and sped 
away. 
The police soon located the automobile, and a high-speed chase 
ensued during which one or more of the Pontiac's occupants shot 
at the pursuing officers. The chase ended when the Pontiac's driver 
lost control and drove into an irrigation canal. The vehicle 
occupants fled on foot and avoided immediate apprehension. A 
short time later, however, Keith Ogburn was found lying in a field 
and was taken into custody. Johnny Gonzalez was arrested after 
he was discovered hiding in the weeds on the bank of the canal. He 
was sporting a blue bandana around his neck. About two and one-
half hours after the search was initiated, Gerardo was seen walking 
down a residential street near the crash scene and was also 
arrested. All three of the men were wearing dark clothing and were 
cold, muddy and wet from the waist down. 
The three men were indicted for burglary, Idaho Code section 18-
1401, and attempted robbery, I.C. §§ 18-6501, -306, and the 
indictment sought an enhancement of their burglary sentences for 
use of a firearm in the course of that crime, I.C. § 19-2520. The 
three men were tried together and none of them testified. 
Id., at p. 24 (footnote omitted). 
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Mr. Ogburn was convicted and sentenced to 30 years fixed followed by 10 
indeterminate, which after a ruling in Gerardo, supra, was reduced to 17 ½ years 
fixed followed by 7 ½ years indeterminate consecutive to an Indiana state 
sentence. (R. p. 147.) He pursued a direct appeal, which was unsuccessful. (R. 
p. 19.) 
Then, as explained in the Memorandum Decision in the instant case, Mr. 
Ogburn initially filed a pro se petition for post conviction relief. (R. p. 190.) 
Counsel was appointed, who ultimately was allowed to file a second amended 
petition. (R. p. 190.) An evidentiary hearing was conducted, and then several 
months later pursuant to Petitioner's request, the case was reopened to take 
additional testimony. (R. p. 191.) 
The district court denied post conviction relief. Petitioner timely appeals. 
(R. p. 201-202.) 
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ISSUE 
Whether the district court erred when it denied post conviction relief after an 
evidentiary hearing, rejecting Petitioner's assertions that he had received 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED POST CONVICTION 
RELIEF FOLLOWING AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING, REJECTING 
PETITIONER'S ASSERTIONS THAT HE HAD RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
A. Standard of Review at Trial and on Appeal 
The relevant standards were comprehensively explained in Medina v. 
State, 132 Idaho 722, 979 P.2d 124 (Ct.App. 1999): 
In order to prevail in a post-conviction proceeding, the applicant 
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the allegations 
upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. Fol/inus 
v. State, 127 Idaho 897, 908 P .2d 590 (Ct. App. 1995); see also 
I.C. § 19-4907 (stating that all rules and statutes applicable in civil 
proceedings are available to the parties in a postconviction relief 
case). Once the district court has denied or granted the post 
conviction application following a hearing, the evidence must be 
viewed most favorably to the trial court's findings. Reynolds v. 
State, 126 Idaho 24, 28, 878 P.2d 198,202 (Ct. App. 1994). 
The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their 
testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all 
matters solely within the province of the district court. Larkin v. 
State, 115 Idaho 72, 764 P.2d 439 (Ct. App. 1988). On appeal, 
findings of fact made by the trial court shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52 (a); Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 
794 P.2d 654 (Ct. App. 1990). Findings supported by competent 
and substantial evidence produced at the hearing will not be 
disturbed. Sanchez v. State, 127 Idaho 709, 711, 905 P.2d 642, 
644 (Ct. App. 1995). However, this Court freely reviews the legal 
conclusions drawn by the trial court from the facts found. Id. 
Id. at p. 724-725. 
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8. Standard of Review Regarding a Claim of Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel 
The standard for evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is 
well established, being set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984). The "benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be 
whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the 
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just 
result." Id. at 686. 
Strickland set forth a two-prong test which a defendant must satisfy in 
order to be entitled to relief. The defendant must demonstrate both that his 
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of 
the proceedings would have been different. Id. at 687-88; State v. Charboneau, 
116 Idaho 129 (1989); Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631 (1986). 
C. The Evidentiary Hearing and the Court's Rulings 
Two main claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were tried at the 
evidentiary hearing. First, Petitioner asserted that his attorney, who is now 
disbarred, did not investigate or present Petitioner's alibi defense. In short, 
Petitioner asserted that the reason he was found in the same field as the co-
defendant was because after a graduation ceremony in Nampa, he had gotten 
into an argument with his girlfriend who threatened to call his parole officer and 
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the police, got upset, left, got high, and inadvertently stumbled into the field 
where he passed out and was found by police. 
Second, Petitioner asserted that his attorney failed to impeach co-
defendant Johnny Gonzalez's girlfriend, Rose Torres, when she testified at trial 
that she had eaten dinner with Johnny Gonzalez and Mr. Ogburn at the 
restaurant in question earlier the day of the attempted robbery at around 5 P.M. 
The attorney's failings here were twofold; the attorney did not impeach Rose 
Torres with her original statement to the police where she said she didn't know 
Mr. Ogburn, and also, the attorney did not call witnesses who would have 
testified that he was with them at that time. 1 
The district court issued a lengthy decision which described the 
evidentiary hearing.2 Petitioner will first detail the court's decision which goes 
over much of what happened at the hearing, and then in the section below, 
Petitioner will provide more detail which the court omitted. 
The Petitioner's first claim deals exclusively with his assertion that 
his counsel, Mr. Mark McHugh, did not investigate, disclose, nor 
present an alibi defense on behalf of the Petitioner. The Petitioner 
disputes that he in fact told his counsel that he was present during 
the alleged crime. Petitioner now claims that he was attending a 
graduation ceremony in Nampa at or near the time of the crime. 
The Petitioner also now offers an alternative explanation as to why 
he was found in the same field as the co-defenants. 
1 Petitioner also raised an issue about the failure of trial counsel to object to a 
police officer's testimony regarding the content of his interview with co-defendant 
Johnny Gonzalez, but this is not being pursued in this appeal. 
2 Actually, the district court's Memorandum Decision appears to largely be a 
verbatim repetition of the state's written closing argument. (R. p. 181-186.) 
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The first area that the Court will focus upon is the testimony of Mark 
McHugh, the Petitioner's attorney during the trial in this case. 
Mr. McHugh testified on December 29, 2009. Earlier, the Court had 
required Mr. McHugh to post bail because the parties had not been able 
to locate him for purposes of subpoenaing him into court. Mr. McHugh 
posted a witness bail and testified in these proceedings. It should also 
be noted that during the course of the hearing, it was presented to the 
Court that Mr. McHugh had been suspended from the practice of law. 
Trial counsel Mark McHugh was questioned both by the Petitioner and 
by the Court regarding his disbarment. Mr. McHugh answered candidly 
and truthfully about the reason and timing of the bar disciplinary action 
against him. His testified that the disbarment was recent in time and 
that the underlying difficulties of depression began long after the 
Petitioner's case. Mr. McHugh indicated that he was not suffering from 
depression back in 2006 when the Petitioner's case went to trial. 
There is neither credible testimony nor any evidence before the Court to 
the contrary that Mr. McHugh was impaired during the time period he 
represented the Petitioner. 
Mr. McHugh testified that the Petitioner had admitted to him in the course 
of the attorney client relationship that he had been present at the 
restaurant that is the subject of this attempted robbery and burglary. 
The Court, during the course of observing Mr. McHugh and evaluating 
his testimony, found that he had an independent recollection of his 
contact with Mr. Ogburn and that he had accurate knowledge of his 
conversations with Mr. Ogburn. The Court will further find that Mr. 
McHugh's credibility in this matter is far more credible than the 
testimony that was presented by Mr. Ogburn. In his testimony, Mr. 
McHugh summarized that he had met with Mr. Ogburn approximately 
ten to fifteen times in addition to talking to him on the telephone. Mr. 
McHugh testified clearly and succinctly that Mr. Ogburn had made 
admissions to him that after a graduation ceremony, he had gotten 
together with Johnny Gonzales and Frank Gerardo, the co-defendants, 
and that they were going to look for some drugs. Ogburn admitted to Mr. 
McHugh details of the attempted robbery and burglary in the course of 
their conversations. Additionally, the defendant admitted his 
presence at the crime not only to his counsel, but also to Special 
Agent Johansson in an interview at the Canyon County jail very shortly 
after the Petitioner was apprehended. 
There is nothing in the record to indicate that the Petitioner did not 
make these admissions other than the Petitioner's denial made 
some three years later in this proceeding. Special Agent 
Johansson testified under oath to the context and content of 
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the admissions made by the Petitioner. His testimony was reflective of 
the information he documented in his report following this interview 
of the Petitioner. A true and accurate copy of the report was provided 
in discovery and was known to Mr. McHugh and the Petitioner. Mr. 
McHugh testified that he was aware of not only his client's 
admissions to Special Agent Johansson, but also believed, based on 
the Petitioner's statements to him, that the defendant was present and 
involved in this crime. 
To present an alibi defense contradicting these clear admissions 
would have required Mr. McHugh to suborn perjury or at least elicit 
testimony that he believed to be untrue. Had Mr. McHugh placed an 
alibi defense at issue, then the statements made to Agent Johansson 
would have been admitted into evidence at trial. Whether for reason of 
Miranda violation or claims of involuntary statements made 
during custodial interrogation, the statements would still be 
admissible for impeachment of the Petitioner. 
The Petitioner engages in speculation and conjectures about Mr. 
McHugh's truthfulness and recollection of the events and asks this Court 
to take the Petitioner's word now looking back in retrospect. "Because of 
the distorting effects of hindsight in reconstructing the circumstances of 
counsel's challenged conduct, there is a strong presumption that 
counsel's performance was within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance- that is, 'sound trial strategy.'" [citations omitted] 
The Petitioner correctly states in his supplemental closing that "If 
Petitioner did admit his involvement then Mr. McHugh's performance 
would be understandable." The Petitioner concedes that if the 
Petitioner's admissions are true, his counsel Mr. McHugh would be 
ethically barred from presenting a defense that he knows is not true. The 
only contention now four years later is that this Court should supplant the 
Petitioner's self-serving version for that counsel's sworn testimony. 
The Petitioner's "alibi" defense was not an option for trial counsel to 
present to the jury because although the Petitioner had been at the 
graduation, he was at the graduation prior to these crimes. He 
was not at the graduation when the crimes occurred at the Lotus 
Garden restaurant. Petitioner told the police that he did not know 
"Johnny" (trial transcript at 684, lines 23-25; at 685-86, lines 25 & lines 1-
4). Yet, Petitioner told trial counsel, among other things, that he had in 
fact met up with Johnny and Frank after the graduation ceremony and 
after he had left his girlfriend and that he had been in the vehicle with 
Johnny and Frank when they all went to the Lotus Garden restaurant; 
that he had been in the parking lot of the Lotus Garden restaurant when 
the crimes occurred and that he had been in the vehicle with the co-
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defendants when police pursued it and when it crashed in the field. Trial 
counsel did not have an alibi defense to present because not only did 
the evidence at trial establish that the police found him in the field with 
the co-defendants, but based upon what the Petitioner told his trial 
counsel, he was with the co-defendants after the graduation. While the 
State may have made a tactical decision not to present these 
admissions by the defendant for fear of a violation of the defendant's 
right to counsel, they would in any event be available for impeachment. 
What Petitioner told his trial counsel was different than what he told 
the police and therefore, counsel in consultation with Petitioner, made 
the decision to present a defense consistent with what Petitioner told the 
police. To do otherwise, would have permitted the State to portray the 
Petitioner as untruthful as he had lied to the police about not knowing 
Johnny. In addition, based upon what Petitioner told counsel, 
Petitioner would have been placed not only in the vehicle, but 
knowing the co-defendants; being at the Lotus Garden crime scene 
and being with them during the police chase and subsequent crash. 
Further, trial counsel could not put the Petitioner on the witness stand 
because he would have been subject to impeachment based on 
Petitioner's prior Robbery conviction out of Indiana. In addition, trial 
counsel had to be cautious not to open the door to a subsequent 
interview by the police of co-defendant Gonzales who directly 
implicated Petitioner in the crimes. 
With respect to counsel's failure to use a prior statement by witness 
Rosie Torres as impeachment, the record of the case and the police 
report admitted during the evidentiary do not show any inconsistency. 
The Petitioner's argument relates to the trial counsel's strategy in 
conducting cross-examination of the witness, not simply the failure to 
object to hearsay. This issue was not raised in the Petitioner's Second 
Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and is therefore 
procedurally barred from consideration. 
Decision, p. 4-9. (R. p. 193-198.) 
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D. The Court Erred in Denying Post Conviction Relief 
Many things are wrong about the court's decision. They are best show 
by simply describing the details from the evidentiary hearing omitted from the 
court's order and then explaining how this evidence effects the court's findings 
and conclusions. But Appellant will begin with an instance of clear error where 
the court's decision simply got wrong what evidence was presented at the 
hearing. 
Regarding the testimony of trial counsel Mark McHugh, the decision is 
incorrect, Mr. McHugh never testified about the reason and timing of his 
disbarment. Mr. McHugh simply denied that his disbarment was related to the 
representation of Mr. Ogburn; denied that his disbarment resulted from mental 
health or substance abuse issues; and denied that there was anything in the 
period of time that he represented Mr. Ogburn that impaired his ability to practice 
law, whether it be substance abuse or mental health issues. (Tr. 12/29/2009, p. 
30, 75.) 
Thus, the court's findings that Mr. McHugh testified about the reasons and 
timing of his disbarment are clear error since he did not testify as to them, nor to 
the specific things that the court believed he did, such his depression. Also, 
since the court was incorrect about what the evidence was, it was likewise 
incorrect in its conclusion that Mr. McHugh answered candidly and truthfully 
about the reason and timing of the bar disciplinary action against him since he 
never testified about it. 
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As to the testimony regarding Mr. McHugh's trial strategy, some of the 
significant portions of his testimony not discussed by the court follow: 
Mr. McHugh did not recall discussing with Mr. Ogburn's mother, sister or 
girlfriend whether they would be testifying. (Tr. 12/29/2009, p. 33-35.) He was 
aware early on in the representation of the graduation ceremony alibi defense 
(Mr. Ogburn and his family were at a graduation ceremony for the Young Marines 
in Nampa) but did not give a notice of alibi to the prosecutor because he had not 
been provided with the evidentiary backup, to wit, a photograph of Mr. Ogburn at 
the graduation and a sign-in sheet.3 (Tr. 12/29/2009, p. 35-36.) 
Mr. McHugh did not contact any witnesses regarding the defense, 
although discussed it with Mr. Ogburn's girlfriend, Chi Maestas. (Tr. 12/29/2009, 
p. 37.) He did not recall ever hearing the name Elaine Salinas (who was Chi's 
roommate and testified at the evidentiary hearing that she saw Chi and Mr. 
Ogburn arguing after the graduation ceremony at their (Chi and Elaine's) home). 
(Tr. 12/29/2009, p. 37.) He did not recall ever interviewing Rose Marie Torres, 
co-defendant Johnny Gonzalez's girlfriend. (Tr. 12/29/2009, p. 39-40.) 
McHugh testified that it was agreed between him and Mr. Ogburn that the 
defense strategy was to stick with the story he had originally told police, which 
was he got in an argument with his girlfriend, got upset, left, got high, and 
inadvertently wandered into the field where he passed out and was found by 
3 The Memorandum Decision states that Petitioner now claims that he was that 
he was attending a graduation and also now offers an alternative explanation as 
to why he was found in the field. However, Mr. McHugh's testimony made it 
clear that these are not recent inventions as suggested by the Memorandum 
Decision's use of the word "now." Mr. Ogburn always made these claims, they 
were just never presented by his attorney. 
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police. (Tr. 12/29/2009, p. 45-47.) McHugh testified that he recalled that Chi 
Maestas corroborated the fact that they had an argument that night, as well as 
that he was at the graduation. (Tr. 12/29/2009, p. 47-48.) However, he did not 
disclose Ms. Maestas as a witness nor call her as a witness at trial. (Tr. 
12/29/2009, p. 48.) Mr. McHugh testified that Mr. Ogburn never demanded that 
she testify. (Tr. 12/29/2009, p. 48, 50.) 
Mr. McHugh testified that the strategy was also to distance Mr. Ogburn 
from the Lotus Garden restaurant. (Tr. 12/29/2009, p. 41-42, 49-50.) However, 
Rose Torres (Johnny Gonzalez's girlfriend) testified that she had dinner at the 
Lotus Garden with Johnny Gonzalez and Mr. Ogburn earlier on the day in 
question even though when originally interviewed by police, she denied knowing 
Mr. Ogburn. Mr. Hugh admitted he did not cross examine Ms. Torres on this 
point. (Tr. 12/29/2009, p. 42-43.) 
The court also questioned Mr. McHugh about this. The court asked Mr. 
McHugh if he had been aware that Ms. Torres ever denied knowing Mr. Ogburn, 
would he have cross examined her on that point. Mr. McHugh testified he wasn't 
sure because Ms. An Ha (restaurant owner's wife) testified she saw the three of 
them (Rose, who worked there, Johnny and Mr. Ogburn) at the restaurant earlier. 
Also, he would have had to potentially call Johnny to verify one way or the other, 
and he would have to call Mr. Ogburn to the stand as well. (Tr. 12/29/2009, p. 
78.) So his answer was yes and no, but he concluded that he didn't feel it was 
advantageous to cross examine her on that. (Tr. 12/29/2009, p. 78.) 
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On cross examination (by the prosecutor), Mr. McHugh testified that they 
decided to stick with the strategy that kept Mr. Ogburn as far away from the Lotus 
Garden as possible, and this defense would just be based on the statements 
by Mr. Ogburn to the police and the chain of custody of the evidence recovered. 
(Tr. 12/29/2009, p. 69-70.) 
The next witness called was Detective Mark Taylor, who was the police 
officer who interviewed Mr. Ogburn after he was arrested. Detective Taylor 
testified that Mr. Ogburn made some comment about being high. (Tr. 12/29/2009, 
p. 84-85.) When his memory was refreshed from a police report, Detective 
Taylor testified that Mr. Ogburn made no statement before invoking his right to an 
attorney.4 (Tr. 12/29/2009, p. 85.) 
Also called at the evidentiary hearing were multiple witnesses who would 
each testify they were at the graduation ceremony with Mr. Ogburn. They were 
Carol Fitzgerald (the teacher of Mr. Ogburn's brother); Chi Maestas (Mr. 
Ogburn's girlfriend at the time of the offense but not by the time of the evidentiary 
hearing); Tami Ogburn (Mr. Ogburn's sister), Crystal Ogburn (Tami's daughter); 
and Jo Ellyn Ogburn (Mr. Ogburn's mother). 
4 At trial, Detective Taylor testified that when asked how he came to be in the 
field, Mr. Ogburn said he had been riding around getting high. (Trial Transcript, 
p. 686-687.) Officer Orvis, who found Mr. Ogburn in the field, testified at trial 
that when asked what was going on Mr. Ogburn was insistent he didn't know 
and eventually told them he got high and woke up in the field. (Trial transcript, p. 
419.) 
Incidentally, the district court took judicial notice of the criminal case proceedings 
{R. p. 101) and itself read from and cited to the trial transcript, which is an exl"libit 
in this appeal. (R. p. 210.) 
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Some significant portions of their testimony follow: Chi Maestas testified 
that Mr. McHugh said he would use them as witnesses, to wit, her, Mr. Ogburn's 
sister and his mother, but he never did. (Tr. 12/29/2009, p. 101 .) Jo Ellyn 
Ogburn testified that Mr. McHugh told her she would be a witness (but she 
wasn't called). (Tr. 12/29/2009, p. 141-142.) Tami Ogburn complained to Mr. 
McHugh that they were not being called as witnesses. (Tr. 12/29/2009, p. 169.) 
Tami Ogburn also testified that Mr. Ogburn had been at her house 
babysitting all day and was there when she got home about 4-4:30 P.M.; they 
then had dinner and went to the graduation ceremony at sometime before 7 
P.M., and he stayed with her right through this time and did not leave. (Tr. 
12/29/2009, p. 163-165, 173.) While Tami Ogburn was on the stand, the court 
read the portion of the trial transcript where Rose Torres (Johnny's Gonzalez's 
girlfriend) testified that at about 5 o clock of the day in question, she, Johnny 
Gonzalez and Keith Ogburn were at the Lotus Garden having dinner. (Tr. 
12/29/2009, p. 174-175.) Tami Ogburn testified at the evidentiary hearing that 
when she heard this testimony at trial, she advised Mr. McHugh that Mr. Ogburn 
was at her house and Rose Torres was lying. (Tr. 12/29/2009, p. 175-176.) She 
asked Mr. McHugh why he didn't cross examine her and he said Johnny's lawyer 
would do it. (Tr. 12/29/2009, p. 176.) 
Finally, Tami's daughter, now 14, testified she remembered Mr. Ogburn 
babysitting that day and being there during dinner. (Tr. 12/29/2009, p. 178-180.) 
Chi Maestas had also testified that she took Mr. Ogburn over to Tami's house 
earlier in the day to baby sit. (Tr. 12/29/2009, p. 102-103.) 
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Some months after the close of the evidentiary hearing, Petitioner 
requested the court reopen it so that the testimony of Mr. Ogburn could be 
presented. Regarding Rose Torres, Mr. Ogburn testified that when he heard her 
testify that he ate dinner at the Lotus Garden restaurant with her and Johnny 
Gonzalez, he told Mr. McHugh she was lying and asked him to cross examine 
her with the police report that they had (produced in discovery). (Tr. 4/8/2010, p. 
29.) Mr. McHugh did not, however, advising that he would cross examine the 
detective who interviewed her. (Tr. 4/8/2010, p. 29.) 
The substance of that police report stated that Rose Torres did not know 
Keith Ogburn. (Tr. 4/8/2010, p. 32.) At trial she testified that she didn't know 
him well, but had dinner with him at the Lotus Garden the day of the attempted 
robbery. 5 (Tr. 4/8/2010, p. 33.) 
It was pointed out at the evidentiary hearing that Mr. McHugh was aware 
of this inconsistency, because he tried to question Detective Taylor about 
whether Rose Torres had early on denied knowing Mr. Ogburn, but the court 
sustained the state's hearsay objection. (Tr. 4/8/2010, p. 33-34.) Further, while 
her testimony was before the jury, nothing was done to rebut it showing that Mr. 
Ogburn didn't have dinner at the Lotus Garden that day but had dinner at 
Tami's. (Tr. 4/8/2010, p. 34.) 
5 While the state and court claim that this is not an inconsistency, neither explain 
just why it isn't (not knowing someone at all is different than not knowing them 
well but well enough to have dinner with them), or more to the point, regardless 
of the degree of inconsistency, why this would not be a valuable area of 
impeachment in any event. 
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On cross examination, the prosecutor stated they had never heard the 
Rose Torres claim in any of his post-conviction petitions before and it's a new 
allegation, to which Mr. Ogburn answered that is incorrect because it was in his 
original petition.6 (Tr. 4/8/2010, p. 41.) The prosecutor did not object to this 
claim, but went on questioning Mr. Ogburn about it. (Tr. 4/8/2010, p. 42.) 
To address the second claim first, the court in its decision is wrong about 
the Rose Torres claim being procedurally defaulted because even if it did not 
reappear in the second amended petition, it was tried by the implied consent of 
the parties, as well as the court. 
The relevant rule of civil procedure provides as follows: 
Rule 15(b). Amendments to conform to the evidence. 
When issues not raised by the pleading are tried by express or 
implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects 
as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the 
pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the 
evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of 
any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend 
does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is 
objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues 
made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be 
amended and shall do so freely when the presentation of the merits 
of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails 
to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would 
prejudice the party in maintaining the party's action or defense upon 
the merits. The court may grant a continuance to enable the 
objecting party to meet such evidence. 
I.R.C.P. Rule 15(b). 
6 The state was in fact aware that this claim was in the original petition because 
it had actually argued in its brief in support of its motion to dismiss that said 
claim should fail inter alia, because counsel's manner of conducting cross 
examination is a strategic decision. (R. p. 48.) 
16 
In our case, the state did not object when the claim was brought up in 
either the first portion of the evidentiary hearing or after it was later reopened. 
The state had the opportunity to cross examine every witness who testified about 
it and in fact cross examined Mr. Ogburn about it. Petitioner argued the issue in 
his written closing and supplemental closing argument. (R. p. 163, 174-175.) 
The state then had an opportunity to respond to the merits in its written closing 
argument (filed after both of Petitioner's written closing arguments), but did not 
The state cannot claim prejudice since it was actually aware of the original 
claim and responded to it in its earlier briefing. If the state, after hearing the 
testimony about the claim at the first day of the evidentiary hearing desired to 
produce evidence regarding it, it could have after the hearing was reopened. 
Finally, since the court itself examined witnesses on the issue and was 
instrumental in developing the evidence on it, Appellant asserts that under these 
circumstances, it erred when it held this claim to be procedurally defaulted 
because it was not raised in the second amended petition. 
As to the merits of this claim, Appellant will begin with Mr. McHugh's 
failure to impeach Rose Torres with her prior inconsistent statement. This is not 
a matter or second guessing counsel's strategic decisions, since Mr. McHugh 
clearly knew it needed to be done, he just didn't know how to do it, which is 
shown by his improper attempt to do so through Detective Taylor. 
In Pratt (Joseph) v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 6 P.3d 831 (2000), the Idaho 
Supreme Court held: 
In addition, strategic and tactical decisions will not be second 
guessed or serve as a basis for post-conviction relief under a claim 
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of ineffective assistance of counsel unless the decision is shown to 
have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the 
relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review. 
Id., p. 584. 
Thus, since Mr. McHugh's failure to impeach Rose Torres with her prior 
inconsistent statement was based on his ignorance of relevant law, it is not an 
unreviewable tactical decision, but is a shortcoming capable of objective review. 
Also capable of objective review are Mr. McHugh's stated reasons for not 
impeaching her directly on cross examination with the prior inconsistent 
statement. While Mr. McHugh claimed it would not have been advantageous to 
do so, this is either disingenuous or shows his even further ignorance of relevant 
law, as well as inadequate preparation. 
The first of his supposed reasons for not cross examining Rose Torres 
about her dinner with Johnny Gonzalez and Keith Ogburn, was that Ms. An Ha 
had also testified that Mr. Ogburn had dinner with Johnny Gonzalez and Rose 
Torres. But this is not true, the trial testimony shows she could not identify the 
third person having dinner (and she testified immediately before Rose Torres). 
(Trial transcript, p. 213-215.) 
Second, Mr. McHugh was concerned that he would have to call Johnny 
Gonzalez to the stand to verify Rose Torres' statement one way or the other. 
This is of course not true and does not even make sense, he can still impeach 
Rose Torres with her prior inconsistent statement without any need to call the co-
defendant in a criminal case, even assuming arguendo that he could do so. The 
same is true as to his concern that he would have put Mr. Ogburn on the stand. 
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He would not, again, she can be impeached without this other evidence being 
introduced. 
Moreover, there was other evidence available which was known to Mr. 
McHugh which would have impeached Rose Torres and showed that Mr. 
Ogburn could not have been having dinner with Rose Torres and Johnny 
Gonzalez at the Lotus Garden about 5 o'clock that day. While presumably every 
family member who testified at the evidentiary hearing could have also testified at 
trial that Mr. Ogburn was at Tami Ogburn's house having dinner and was there 
until they left for the graduation, we are certain that Tami could and she told Mr. 
McHugh so. Even if Mr. McHugh choose not to call the other witnesses 
regarding the graduation ceremony because of the time gap between the end of 
it and the attempted robbery, this same concern does not apply (nor do the 
others) to the evidence that he was not at the Lotus Garden with Johnny 
Gonzalez earlier on the day of the attempted robbery. 7 
In short, Mr. McHugh's performance at the trial was deficient since he 
lacked the basic legal knowledge of how to impeach a witness, and his later 
explanations for why he did not show only a further lack of knowledge of both the 
law and the evidence admitted at the trial. Further, he did not put on other 
evidence which would distance Mr. Ogburn from the Lotus Garden, even though 
7 The same is true of a more minor point. Karen Ha (daughter of the owner of 
the Lotus Garden), testified that at about 9 P.M., or approximately an hour before 
the attempted robbery, she saw the same Grand Prix outside the restaurant. 
Regardless of when exactly the graduation ended, it was clear that it was well 
after 9 P.M., and so Mr. McHugh had evidence available to him which would 
have rebutted the inference that Mr. Ogburn had been there earlier casing the 
restaurant. 
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that was Mr. McHugh's declared strategy and he was aware of the evidence. 
Further, these failings prejudiced Mr. Ogburn. As he pointed out in his original 
petition, the Rose Torres identification of him was the only evidence tying him to 
either Johnny Gonzalez or the Lotus Garden, other than being found in the same 
field later on, which is the next point addressed. (R. p. 27.) 
To now discuss the first issue, which is the failure to investigate or present 
an alibi defense, as succinctly argued by Petitioner in his written closing 
argument: 
Ogburn had multiple witnesses testify as to his potential alibi. Mr. 
McHugh did not interview the individuals who testified at his evidentiary 
hearing. His mother Jo Ellyn Ogburn testified he had attended his 
brother's graduation from the Young Marines in Nampa. The ceremony 
ran late. His sister Tami Ogburn testified he had watched her children 
all day. He would not have had the opportunity to be at the Lotus 
Garden earlier that day. He was also present for dinner. Carol 
Fitzgerald Ogburn's brother's teacher recalled him being present for 
the entirety of the ceremony and it running late. Crystal Ogburn is his 
niece. She remembers him watching her. 
Ogburn's most compelling witness was Chi Maestas. She testified what 
happened after the graduation. She offered an alternative theory as to 
why Ogburn would be in the field hiding from the police. She knew he 
was on parole and threatened to call his parole officer. She knew he 
was using methamphetamine. They had just been in an animated 
argument. 
Ms. Maestas made multiple attempts to contact Mr. McHugh, but was 
never interviewed about her version of the night's events. Elaine 
Salina corroborated the presence of Ogburn in the trailer and the fight 
with Ms. Maestas. Karen Ha, an eye witness to the crime, testified the 
restaurant was approached by the assailants at ten o'clock p.m. (Trial 
transcript, Page 108, L. L. 8-25) If Ms. Maestas is to be believed it 
would have been impossible for Ogburn to be present at the crime 
scene. (R. 163-164.) 
Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine and Written Closing Argument, at p. 
5-6. (R. p. 163-164.) 
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Regardless of the defense the court decided that Mr. McHugh could not 
put on, it is clear is that the defense strategy that Mr. McHugh and Mr. Ogburn 
agreed upon was not followed. The court found, based on the testimony of Mr. 
McHugh, that counsel would present a defense consistent with what Petitioner 
had told the police. That story was, as Mr. McHugh repeatedly testified, that Mr. 
Ogburn got in an argument with his girlfriend, got upset, left, got high, and 
inadvertently wandered into the field where he passed out and was found by 
police. (Tr. 12/29/2009, p. 45-47.) And as established by the prosecution on 
cross examination, Mr. McHugh intended to establish that defense just based on 
the statements of Mr. Ogburn to the police (and chain of custody issues). (Tr. 
12/29/2009, p. 69-70.) 
The problem with Mr. McHugh's plan is that Mr. Ogburn never told that 
story to police. This was made clear by Detective Taylor's testimony at the 
evidentiary hearing, as well as the trial testimony described above. So what the 
jury heard was not that Mr. Ogburn got into an argument with his girlfriend, got 
upset, left, got high, and inadvertently stumbled into the field where he passed 
out. Instead, the jury heard that Mr. Ogburn was riding around getting high 
and also, he got high and woke up in the field. 
The full version that the jury did not hear provides an alternate theory of 
why he was in the field, which if believed by the jury, would result in his acquittal. 
While this is true even without the proper impeachment of Rose Torres, it is of 
course a much stronger defense where any link is broken between Mr. Ogburn 
and the restaurant and/or Johnny Gonzalez. The abbreviated version the jury did 
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hear, however, even if believed by the jury, does not actually provide a defense. 
In other words, riding around getting high and/or passing out in the field is not 
inconsistent with first attempting to rob a restaurant, and some might argue, is 
perfectly consistent with it. 
Thus, the issue is not as addressed by the district court, which is that Mr. 
McHugh could not present the alibi defense without essentially suborning perjury 
or at least evidence he believed to be untrue. Rather, the issue is that Mr. 
McHugh told Mr. Ogburn he would be presenting the agreed upon defense 
(which is an alibi defense because it was based on him not being at the robbery), 
and then didn't do so. The defense he pursued made no sense and actually was 
not a defense to the crime. Appellant asserts that this was objectively deficient 
performance that prejudiced him. 
In addition, Mr. Ogburn was asked at one point by the prosecutor whether 
he studied the reports to see what things could have been done differently. He 
answered no, and that he is alleging that nothing was done the way he wanted it 
done. (Tr. 4/8/2010, p. 38-39.) While obviously an expression of frustration by 
the Petitioner to a semi-facetious question, it is emblematic of the case. Again, 
the defense put on by Mr. McHugh, to wit, that Mr. Ogburn was riding around 
getting high, is actually not a defense since even if true it is not a reason he can 
be found not guilty. 
Given this, Petitioner asserts that the correct standard is actually not that 
of Strickland, but rather the presumption of prejudice established in United States 
v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). In Cronic, the Supreme Court held that "if 
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counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial 
testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the 
adversary process itself presumptively unreliable." Id. at 659. 
Finally, regarding the credibility determinations of the court, even though 
they are generally the sole province of the district court, some comments are in 
order. First, as explained above, the court found that Mr. McHugh testified 
"truthfully and candidly" about something he did not testify about, and so the 
court's determinations are suspect to begin with . 
Additionally, the record belies several of Mr. Hugh's claims. In other 
words, it is not a matter of which witness to believe, but rather, the trial transcript 
itself shows that Mr. McHugh was wrong. The most important example is that 
Mr. Ogburn did not tell the police that he had gotten in an argument with his 
girlfriend, got upset, left, got high, and inadvertently stumbled into the field where 
he passed out. Therefore , Mr. McHugh could not have based that defense on 
this information coming in through the police. And the court did not have to scour 
the record to determine this, it was established via Detective Taylor at the 
evidentiary hearing . 8 
Despite all of this, the court simply finds that Mr. McHugh is the credible 
one, ignoring that the record proves him incredible, the other witnesses 
dispute his testimony, and the rather remarkable fact of his disbarment. 
8 Another example was that Ms. An Ha did not identify Mr. Ogburn so that could 
not be a reason Mr. McHugh did not cross examine Rose Torres, although this 
does not appear to have been brought out at the evidentiary hearing . 
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CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, for the reasons as stated above, Appellant/Petitioner 
respectfully requests that the district court's denial of post conviction relief be 
/) / 
reversed and that this Court vacate his convictions. /,/ , ,/ · 
/ . / 
DATED this~ day of September, 2011. ~/ 
/ ' / . 
/ 
Greg S. fo!lvey 
Attorn~ for Appellant 
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